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INTRODUCTION  
If you happen to use one of the 200 million
1
 iPhone, iPad, and 
iPod touch devices on the planet, Apple knows where you are.  
Tucked away in a file
2
 on every user‘s device is a regularly 
updated list of location-based information.
3
  Apple claims that it 
uses that information to improve the response time of software that 
requires a user‘s location.4  But that sensitive information is not 
kept secret.
5
  The list of a user‘s locations is stored in an 
unprotected, unencrypted file, open to every application on a user‘s 
iOS
6
 device.
7
 
Apple has since updated its software to reduce the amount of 
location-based information it stores and to give users more control 
over how their information is used.
8
  While that change is 
 
 1 See Graham Spencer, Over 200 Million iOS Devices Sold, 25 Million iPads and $2.5 
Billion Paid to Developers, MACSTORIES, http://www.macstories.net/news/over-200-
million-ios-devices-sold-25-million-ipads-and-2-5-billion-paid-to-developers/ (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2011). 
 2 The file, called consolidated.db, was discovered by two hackers in the Spring of 
2011. See Nick Bilton, 3G Apple iOS Devices Are Storing Users‟ Location Data, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011, 3:04 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/3g-apple-ios-
devices-secretly-storing-users-location/ [hereinafter Bilton, 3G Devices]. 
 3 See id. See also Nick Bilton, Apple Updates Software to Fix Problems With 
Collecting Location Data, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2011, 3:42 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2011/05/04/apple-ios-software-release-fixes-location-bug/ [hereinafter Bilton, Apple 
Updates Software] (noting that a problem with Apple‘s mobile devices enabled them to 
collect customers‘ locations). 
 4 See Bilton, Apple Updates Software, supra note 3. 
 5 See Bilton, 3G Devices, supra note 2.  
 6  iOS is Apple‘s mobile operating system which runs on the iPhone, iPad and iPod 
touch. See iOS 4.3 Software Update, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ios/ (last visited Sept. 
9, 2011). 
 7 See Bilton, 3G Devices, supra note 2.  
 8 See Bilton, Apple Updates Software, supra note 3. 
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beneficial for Apple‘s users, it was a business decision.9  Apple 
was not obligated to change its policy.  It was not in violation of 
any law.
10
 
Apple‘s location-storing episode highlights a gap that exists in 
current privacy law.  The smartphone,
11
 a cell phone with PC-like 
functionality, has made it possible for users to turn their current 
location into a practical tool.
12
  Smartphone applications, called 
location-based mobile services (LBMS),
13
 are designed to facilitate 
this new functionality.  These applications, however, operate in a 
largely unregulated space.  Courts that are forced to deal with 
mobile privacy issues are left with a statute that was drafted in 
1986,
14
 years before the Internet took off
15
 and the smartphone was 
first introduced.
16
  In many cases, actions that intuitively seem 
 
 9 Apple‘s decision to change how iOS stores user information was part of a public 
relations campaign to appease users after it was discovered that users‘ locations were 
being stored. See AppleInsider Staff, Apple Releases iOS 4.3.3 with Fixes for Location 
Database Controversy, APPLEINSIDER (May 4, 2011, 1:25 PM), http://www.appleinsider. 
com/articles/11/05/04/apple_releases_ios_4_3_3_with_fixes_for_location_database_ 
controversy.html.  The proposed changes, along with answers to other questions, were 
provided in a press release shortly after the consolidated.db file was discovered. See 
Apple Q&A On Location Data, APPLE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/ 
2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html; Bilton, 3G Devices, supra note 2.  
 10 See Karen Gullo, Apple Sued Over User Location Data Storage on IPhones, IPads, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2011, 1:52 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-
25/apple-sued-over-user-location-data-storage-on-iphones-ipads.html. 
 11 The smartphone as a class includes iPhones, Blackberries, and other Android OS-
enabled devices. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 25 FCC Rcd. 11407, 11412 (2010).   
There were approximately 78.2 million smartphone devices in the United States as of 
June 2011. See 50 Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA: THE WIRELESS ASS‘N (June 2011), 
http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10378.  
 12 This is not to imply that a message will be received or read by the entire Internet.  
Rather that a public message, like a tweet, is accessible by everyone with an Internet 
connection.  
 13 See GSM Ass‘n, Permanent Reference Document SE.23: Location Based Services, 
GSM WORLD, 11 (2003), http://www.gsmworld.com/documents/se23.pdf [hereinafter 
Location Based Services].  
 14 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986). 
 15 For example, current privacy law would apply differently to a phone call transmitted 
digitally and one transmitted over copper wires. See infra Part III.B. 
 16 The first smartphone was the IBM Simon, created in 1992. BUSINESS2COMMUNITY, 
A Look Back in Time at the First Smartphone Ever, BUSINESS2COMMUNITY.COM (June 
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wrong, like Apple‘s secret storing of a user‘s location, simply do 
not fall within the scope of existing privacy law.  Furthermore, 
actions that do come within the language of existing regulations 
are resolved in ways that do not take into consideration the current 
state of technology or how it is used by the public. 
This Note addresses the need to build a regulatory system that 
can correctly deal with location-based mobile information.  Part I 
describes the current status of the technology industry and outlines 
what information software developers can currently access from a 
user‘s device.  Part II examines the statute regulating this area, the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and points out 
some of the problems courts face when applying it to cases that 
deal with information privacy.  Part III highlights where the 
application of this regime produces conflicting results.  Lastly, Part 
IV examines changes to the ECPA that will bring it up to speed 
with modern uses of technology, and suggests why proposed 
legislation does not go far enough to make a substantial change. 
I. WHAT THEY KNOW ABOUT YOU 
LBMSs are third-party applications commonly known as apps.  
Smartphone users download these apps from the Internet and 
install them onto their devices.
17
  The process is similar to 
downloading and installing software onto a computer.  Once 
installed, the LBMS purportedly uses a person‘s current location to 
perform useful functions
18—anything from providing directions to 
 
27, 2011), http://www.business2community.com/mobile-apps/a-look-back-in-time-at-the-
first-smartphone-ever-040906.  
 17 Users can download applications either directly from a third-party‘s website or from 
a digital ―app store,‖ a specialized application or website that facilitates this type of 
content delivery.  App stores are usually preinstalled by the phone manufacturer on a 
given device.  The largest marketplace for these ―apps‖ is the iTunes app store operated 
by Apple. See Apple Introduces the New iPhone 3G, APPLE (June 9, 2008), 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/06/09Apple-Introduces-the-New-iPhone-3G.html.  
At the time of the writing of this note there are over 300,000 apps available for download 
onto the iPhone alone. See Federico Viticci, How Many iPhone Apps Are There? 306,554 
– And 60,000 iPad Apps, MACSTORIES.NET (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.macstories.net/ 
news/how-many-iphone-apps-are-there-306554-and-60000-ipad-apps/.    
 18 See Location Based Services, supra note 13, at 11. 
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allowing users to share their location with friends.  There are 
thousands of potential uses for a user‘s location.19 
Just like any other piece of software, installing an LBMS 
requires that a user agree to certain conditions.
20
  These conditions 
may be agreed to at the initial installation of the app or later on 
during its use.
21
  The terms a user agrees to control not only the use 
of the app but also the application‘s use of the information stored 
on the device.
22
  Once an LBMS makes its way on to a user‘s 
device it often has access to a wealth of information beyond what a 
user provides
23—particularly with regard to location-based 
information. 
A. Location-Based Information 
One class of LBMS facilitates a user‘s choice to share his 
current location with others.  How each application achieves this 
goal varies.  For example, ―check in‖ applications like foursquare24 
or Gowalla
25
 encourage users to share their location with friends 
by ―checking in‖ at a specific place.26  This ―check-in‖ often links 
 
 19 For example, mobile apps may be used for social networking, booking a vacation, 
sharing photographs, or many other including ones that are constantly being developed. 
See, e.g., Doug Gross, New Wave of Location-Based Apps Mark a „Paradigm Shift,‟ 
CNN (June 29, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-29/tech/discovery.apps_1_ 
android-free-app-hipstamatic?_s=PM:TECH. 
 20 Computer software commonly prompts users upon installation to agree or disagree 
with certain conditions known as the End User License Agreement. See, e.g., Specht v. 
Netscape Commc‘ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff‟d, 306 F.3d 17 
(2d Cir. 2002) (describing an End User License Agreement as ―the contract allegedly 
made by the offeror of the software and the party effecting the download‖).  On the 
Android app marketplace, for example, users are prompted prior to downloading and 
installing an app of the permissions that are required for that app to run.  If a user does 
not agree to the conditions, he is not allowed to install the app. See Frank McPherson, 
Android App Permissions Explained, SOCIALTIMES (July 29, 2010, 9:42 PM), http://social 
times.com/android-app-permissions-explained_b47761.  
 21 See infra Part I.C. 
 22 See Application Licensing, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://developer.android.com 
/guide/publishing/licensing.html (last visited Sept.12, 2011). 
 23 See Bilton, 3G Devices, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 24 See FOURSQUARE, www.foursquare.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). 
 25 See GOWALLA, www.gowalla.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). 
 26 Shane Snow, Foursquare vs. Gowalla: Location-Based Throwdown, MASHABLE 
(Dec. 25, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/12/25/foursquare-gowalla/.  
LEVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
196 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:191 
to other social networks
27
 and rewards a user for his continued 
participation.
28
  This reward practice is utilized by start-up 
companies and by subdivisions of larger, well-established, social 
networks, like Facebook.
29
  The rewards encourage users to share 
their location with their friends more frequently, thereby using the 
app, the company‘s product, more frequently. 
Apps that do not use a ―check in‖ model automatically 
broadcast a user‘s location to others within the application.30  
Google Latitude
31
 (―Latitude‖), for example, is primarily an 
extension of the mapping program Google Maps.
32
  Latitude 
allows users to share their current location with existing contacts.
33
  
Unlike the ―check in‖ model which broadcasts a message to a 
user‘s existing network, Latitude displays a user‘s location on a 
 
 27 Linking to social networks drastically increases the overall effect of each individual 
check in by spreading that information to a larger number of users. The average user on 
Facebook has 130 friends. See Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press 
/info.php?statistics (last visited Dec. 3, 2010); cf. Primates on Facebook: Even Online the 
Neocortex is the Limit, ECONOMIST (Feb. 26, 2009) http://www.economist.com/ 
node/13176775?story_id=13176775 (noting that while the average Facebook user has 
120 friends, the maximum number is set by biological factors). But see Cameron Marlow, 
Maintained Relationships on Facebook, OVERSTATED (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://overstated.net/2009/03/09/maintained-relationships-on-facebook.  
 28 On foursquare, the user who ―checks in‖ at any given location the most is deemed 
the ―mayor‖ of that location. What is a Foursquare “Mayor”?, FOURSQUARE, 
http://support.foursquare.com/entries/188303-what-is-a-foursquare-mayor (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2011).  Many businesses offer special deals or savings to the mayor of that 
location. See Robert Gembarski, FourSquare: Unlock Check-In Specials, BRANDING 
PERSONALITY (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.brandingpersonality.com/foursquare-unlock-
check-in-specials/.  Furthermore, users who hold ten mayorships at once receive a 
―badge‖ on their profiles that designates them as a ―Super Mayor.‖ The Full List of 
Foursquare Badges, 4SQUAREBADGES.COM, http://www.4squarebadges.com/foursquare-
badge-list/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).   
 29 See Josh Constine, Facebook Testing Places Check-In Incentive Deals and Rewards, 
INSIDE FACEBOOK (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/10/28/places-
check-in-deals-rewards/. 
 30 See Jennifer Van Grove, iPhone App Uses Background Location for Automatic 
Checkins on Foursquare, MASHABLE (Aug. 25, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010 
/08/25/checkmate-for-foursquare/. 
 31 See Google Latitude, GOOGLE MOBILE, http://www.google.com/mobile/latitude/ (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2010). 
 32 See generally Google Maps, GOOGLE, http://maps.google.com (last visited Sept. 13, 
2011). 
 33 See Google Latitude, supra note 31. 
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map to friends they select from their existing contact list.
34
  Other 
mobile apps mimic this mapping function and combine it with 
additional features.  Apps like Friends Around,
35
 for example, use 
a hybrid model that combines reward-based ―check ins‖ with 
Latitude-like visualization.
36
 
B. Determining A User‟s Location 
No matter which model an app uses, a LBMS can determine a 
user‘s current location in four ways: (1) using Global Positioning 
Service (―GPS‖);37 (2) using the user‘s unique Cell-ID;38 (3) 
tracking the user‘s Internet connection if he has access to Wi-Fi;39 
and (4) allowing the user to specify his current location.
40
  Since 
the fourth option is user-controlled, only releasing location 
information specified by the user, this note will focus exclusively 
on the first three methods.
41
 
1. GPS 
GPS is the most accurate way to determine a user‘s location.42  
GPS locates each user through a process called trilateration,
43
 
which uses twenty-seven satellites in orbit above the Earth to plot 
 
 34 Id. 
 35 See FRIENDS AROUND, http://friendsaround.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 36 See Zila Networks Raises the Social Standard with „Friends Around Me‟ Mobile 
Application for the iPhone, PRWEB (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.prweb.com/releases/ 
Friends-Around-Me/mobile-social-network/prweb3868854.htm.  
 37 See Obtaining User Location, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://developer.android.com/ 
guide/topics/location/obtaining-user-location.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
 38 Shu Wang, Jungwon Min & Byung K. Yi, Location Based Services for Mobiles: 
Technologies and Standards, LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM, 21 (2008), http://blue-
penguin.org/cache/location-based-services-for-mobiles.pdf. 
 39 See Obtaining User Location, supra note 37.   
 40 See Sarah Perez, Google Latitude iPhone App Revealed: Should You Use It?, 
READWRITEWEB (Dec. 8, 2010, 8:07 AM), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/ 
google_latitude_iphone_app_spotted.php. 
 41 Keep in mind that a location based mobile service has access to whichever of these 
methods is available on a given device.  When one is unavailable, another may be used. 
See Obtaining User Location, supra note 37; see also Location and my Privacy FAQ, 
WINDOWS PHONE, http://www.microsoft.com/windowsphone/en-us/howto/wp7/web/ 
location-and-my-privacy.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
 42 See Obtaining User Location, supra note 37.   
 43 See Tracy V. Wilson, How GPS Phones Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://electronics. 
howstuffworks.com/gps-phone.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).  
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the intersection of at least three spheres drawn around the user and 
three satellites to determine his exact position on the ground.
44
  
Although extremely accurate, GPS suffers from several limitations.  
First, it is slow, and can sometimes take minutes to return a 
result.
45
  Second, it is processor-intensive and will quickly drain a 
phone‘s battery.46  Third, it is most effective when the user is 
outdoors.
47
  Because of these limitations, GPS is not always the 
most practical way to determine a user‘s location.48 
2. The Cell-ID Method 
The Cell-ID
49
 method is less accurate than GPS, but more 
versatile.
50
  This process uses a carrier‘s cell network, not 
satellites, to determine a user‘s location.51  Conceptually, the Cell-
ID method is much simpler than GPS.  Every cell phone on a given 
network is assigned a unique identification number.
52
  When a 
user‘s phone is on, that phone will connect to the nearest cell tower 
to establish a connection.
53
  By searching for a specific ID number 
it is possible to identify the tower to which a given device is 
 
 44 See id. 
 45 See Using Geolocation, MOZILLA DEVELOPER NETWORK, https://developer.mozilla 
.org/En/Using_geolocation (last modified Aug. 12, 2011) (explaining that GPS can take a 
minute or more to fix a user‘s location, but that less accurate information like his IP 
address may be returned faster). 
 46 See Adroit Allen, The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Dedicated GPS vs A 
Smart Phone GPS, HUBPAGES, http://adroitalien.hubpages.com/hub/The-Benefits-Of-A-
Dedicated-GPS-vs-A-Smart-Phone-GPS 78 (last visited Sept. 11, 2011). 
 47 See Wilson, supra note 43 (explaining how GPS locates a cell phone). 
 48 Apple explained that the inability to reliably track user location is one of the reasons 
it needed to store user location data.  Capturing that information was justified because it 
improved the performance of certain mobile apps. See Apple Q&A On Location Data, 
supra note 9. 
 49 See Wang, supra note 38, at 21. 
 50 See Adding Location to a Non GPS Phone: Introducing CellID, MOBIFORGE, http:// 
mobiforge.com/developing/story/adding-location-a-non-gps-phone-introducing-cellid 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2011). 
 51 See id.  
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. 
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connected.
54
  Because the tower is fixed, the location of the tower 
will reveal the location of the user.
55
 
The Cell-ID method has benefited from the explosion of the 
cell phone industry.
56
  There are now over 251,000 reported cell 
sites in the United States, compared to the 913 that existed the year 
before the ECPA was passed.
57
  The proliferation of cell sites is 
directly related to the increase in the number of cell phone users.
58
  
As the density of cell phone users in an area grows, the only way 
for a carrier to accommodate the increased number of customers is 
to divide that area into smaller and smaller sectors.
59
  Carriers then 
ensure that there is enough bandwidth to service the user base in 
that area by supplying each sector with its own tower.
60
  The 
smaller a sector is or the more towers there are, the more 
accurately an individual can be located.
61
  Currently, carriers 
commonly use ―microcells,‖ towers with a range of forty feet.62  
The Cell-ID method will become even more accurate over time as 
the range each tower covers decreases. 
Cell-ID location has also benefited from the rise of technology, 
making it possible to locate a user within any given sector, 
irrespective of the sector‘s size.63  A user within range of multiple 
 
 54 See id. 
 55 Cell phone towers, like Wi-Fi networks, cover a certain distance.  If a user is 
connected to a tower, it is certain then that he is located somewhere within that tower‘s 
covered range. See id. 
 56 The number of cell phone towers has tripled over the last decade. See In re U.S. for 
Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832 (S.D. Tex. 2010).   
 57 See id. 
 58  To keep up with the demand for mobile data usage at broadband speeds, more 
towers need to be installed. See The FCC Says the U.S. Needs More Cell Phone Towers, 
WIRELESS INDUS. NEWS (June 28, 2011), http://www.wirelessindustrynews.org/news-jun-
2011/2581-062811-win-news.html; Dawn Kawamoto, The Incredible, Shrinking Cell 
Phone Tower: Alcatel-Lucent Offers an Alternative, DAILYFINANCE (Mar. 22, 2011, 6:00 
AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/03/22/the-incredible-shrinking-cellphone-tower 
-alcatel-lucent-offers/; LTE Cell Phone Tower Industry Growth, DEADZONES.COM (Apr. 
7, 2010), http://www.deadzones.com/2010/04/cell-phone-tower-industry-growth. html. 
 59 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
 60 See id. (explaining that the rise of 3G technology is also increasing this demand). 
 61 See id. at 833.  
 62 See id. 
 63 Id. 
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towers can be located using triangulation.
64
  The process is similar 
to the trilateration method used by GPS, but relies on the overlap 
of signals in space rather than on the ground.
65
  By correlating the 
time and angle at which a phone‘s signal arrives at multiple base 
stations, the carrier can determine a user‘s location within fifty 
meters or less.
66
 
3. Wi-Fi Geolocation 
Wi-Fi geolocation has been available since at least 2008
67
 and 
it is becoming even more useful as the number of smartphones 
increases.
68
  Building off of the Google Gears geolocation project, 
the World Wide Web Consortium
69
 (―W3C‖) released a 
geolocation application programming interface (―API‖) in 
February of 2010.
70
 
The Wi-Fi method of geolocation uses various location-based 
clues to determine the location from which a user is currently 
accessing the web.
71
  These ―clues‖ include information gathered 
from the media access control (―MAC‖) address of other available 
Wi-Fi networks, cell towers, Bluetooth MAC address, radio-
frequency identifier (―RFID‖), Cell-ID, and GPS signal.72  By 
collecting and storing this information, namely the MAC 
 
 64 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 65 See Chris Smith, Cell Phone Triangulation Accuracy Is All Over The Map, SEARCH 
ENGINE LAND (Sept. 28, 2008, 4:59 PM), http://searchengineland.com/cell-phone-
triangulation-accuracy-is-all-over-the-map-14790. 
 66 Emerging versions of this technology promise to be more accurate. See In re U.S. 
for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 827, 833 (S.D. Tex. 2010).  
 67 See Charles Wiles, Introducing the Gears Geolocation API for All Laptop WiFi 
Users, GOOGLE CODE BLOG (Oct. 21, 2008), http://googlecode.blogspot.com/2008 
/10/introducing-gears-geolocation-api-for.html. 
 68 See generally Marguerite Reardon & Tom Krazit, Google: Oops, We Spied On Your 
Wi-Fi, CNET NEWS (May 14, 2010, 2:49 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-
20005051-266.html. 
 69 See About W3C, W3C, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
 70 See Geolocation API Specification: Editor‟s Draft 10 February 2010, W3C (Feb. 
10, 2010), http://dev.w3.org/geo/api/spec-source.html (providing a simple or less 
technical description of the API); see also W3C Geolocation API, WEBSCANNOTES, 
http://webscannotes.com/?page_id=425 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).  
 71 See W3C Geolocation API, supra note 70. 
 72 See id. 
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addresses
73
 of other Wi-Fi networks, the W3C API can build a 
profile for each location.
74
  As more information is gathered, it is 
possible to pinpoint a user‘s location at any given time.75  While 
very few mobile browsers currently support the W3C API, the 
number is rising and will likely continue to increase.   
 
C. Access To Information Stored On Your Device 
LBMS do more than collect location-based data.  Each app a 
user chooses to install on his smartphone can access different 
information stored on that device.
76
  This access, however, is never 
unlimited.
77
  The level of access granted to each application is 
 
 73 See IEEE Computer Soc‘y, 802 IEEE Standards For Local and Metropolitan Area 
Networks: Overview and Architecture, INST. OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG‘RS, 20 (2002), 
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802-2001.pdf, (―The concept of universal 
addressing is based on the idea that all potential members of a network need to have a 
unique identifier (if they are going to coexist in the network).‖).  
 74 See Geolocation API Specification: Editor‟s Draft 10 February 2010, supra note 70. 
 75 See Wi-Fi Based Real-Time Location Tracking: Solutions and Technology, CISCO 
SYSTEMS, 1–4 (2006), http://www.techrepublic.com/whitepapers/wi-fi-based-real-time-
location-tracking-solutions-and-technology/283735 (explaining how Wi-Fi geolocation 
works, specifically that the calculation of a user‘s location will be more refined if there is 
more information available). 
 76 While no application can access user information automatically, each application 
has access to the data that it pulls into its ―sandbox.‖ iOS Application Programming 
Guide: The Application Runtime Environment, APPLE, http://developer.apple.com/library/ 
ios/#documentation/iphone/conceptual/iphoneosprogrammingguide/RuntimeEnvironment
/RuntimeEnvironment.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2011).  ―The sandbox is a set of fine-
grained controls limiting an application‘s access to files, preferences, network resources, 
hardware, and so on.  Each application has access to the contents of its own sandbox but 
cannot access other applications‘ sandboxes.‖ Id.  The data that makes it into the sandbox 
is normally defined by user permissions. See, e.g., id.; Security and Permissions, 
ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/security.html 
(last updated Sept. 13, 2011). 
 77 See, e.g., supra note 76 (―A central design point of the Android security architecture 
is that no application, by default, has permission to perform any operations that would 
adversely impact other applications, the operating system, or the user.  This includes 
reading or writing the user‘s private data (such as contacts or e-mails), reading or writing 
another application‘s files, performing network access, keeping the device awake, etc.  
An application‘s process runs in a security sandbox.  The sandbox is designed to prevent 
applications from disrupting each other, except by explicitly declaring the permissions 
they need for additional capabilities not provided by the basic sandbox.  The system 
handles requests for permissions in various ways, typically by automatically allowing or 
disallowing based on certificates or by prompting the user.  The permissions required by 
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determined by a set of controls called ―permissions.‖78  
Applications do not have access to any user information by default, 
and can only access whatever the ―permissions‖ allow them to.79  
These restraints can be defined either at the installation of the 
application by a traditional ―clickwrap‖ license,80 or later on 
throughout the use of the application by user prompts.
81
  The type 
of permission required depends on the information being sought by 
the application and varies according to the phone‘s operating 
system.
82
 
Permissions are important because a user-defined permission is 
evidence that a user consents to the application accessing that 
data.
83
  In an attempt to gain permission most privacy policies 
 
an application are declared statically in that application, so they can be known up-front at 
install time and will not change after that.‖). 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id.  
 80 See Feldman v. Google Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (―A 
clickwrap agreement appears on an internet webpage and requires that a user consent to 
any terms or conditions by clicking on a dialog box on the screen in order to proceed with 
the internet transaction.‖); see also Ed Bayley, The Clicks That Bind: Ways Users 
“Agree” to Online Terms of Service, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.eff.org/wp/clicks-bind-ways-users-agree-online-terms-service. 
 81 For example, an application that wants to access your GPS data can satisfy the 
above requirement by: (1) including as part of a general term of service agreement that 
you allow them to access your location data at all times or; (2) prompting the user with a 
question, similar to ―do you want to allow X to access your location,‖ that governs what 
the application is allowed to do.  Following these procedures, an application can access 
any of the information it wants on a user‘s device, contacts, e-mails, etc., as long as it 
makes sure it secures permission first. See Katherine Noyes, Why Android App Security is 
Better Than for the iPhone, PC WORLD BUS. CTR. (Aug. 6, 2010, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/202758/why_android_app_security_is_be
tter_than_for_the_iphone.html; see also About Permissions for Third-Party Applications, 
BLACKBERRY, http://docs.blackberry.com/en/smartphone_users/deliverables/22178/ 
About_permissions_for_third-party_apps_50_778147_11.jsp (last visited Sept. 29, 2011); 
Security and Permissions, supra note 76.  
 82 See Security and Permissions, supra note 76; Security Overview, APPLE, 47 (June 7, 
2011), 
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Security_Ove
rview/Security_Overview.pdf; BlackBerry Smartphones: UI Guidelines Version 6.0, 
BLACKBERRY (Nov. 22, 2010), http://docs.blackberry.com/en/developers/subcategories 
/?userType=21&category=Java+Development+Guidelines. 
 83 See infra Part II.  Every application gains the consent necessary to access user 
information in a different way.  For example, Google Maps uses a traditional clickwrap 
structure that requires the user to agree to a list of terms and conditions when the program 
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inform users about: (1) the type of information collected; and (2) 
the purpose for collecting that information.
84
  Applications tend to 
define the type of data broadly in an attempt to strike a balance 
between providing enough information so that application may 
gain consent to access a user‘s data85 and being broad enough to 
avoid ruling out specific information.
86
  Similarly the purpose of 
the data acquisition is also very broad.  For example, a privacy 
policy may state that user data can be collected for anything related 
to ―improving the content of the Service.‖87  As the scope of 
―improving the content of the Service‖ is never defined, any usage 
 
is initially launched. Peter S. Vogel, A Worrisome Truth:  Internet Privacy is Impossible, 
TECHNEWSWORLD (June 8, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.technewsworld.com/ 
story/72610.html.  Foursquare, on the other hand, embeds its terms in a privacy policy 
posted on its website, and not within the app. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 84  See, e.g., Privacy Policy, FOURSQUARE, http://foursquare.com/legal/privacy (last 
updated Jan. 12, 2011) (―Personal Information You Provide to Us: We receive and store 
any information you enter on our Service or provide to us in any other way. The types of 
Personal Information collected may include your name, email address, phone number, 
birthday, Twitter and/or Facebook usernames, use information regarding your use of our 
Service and browser information. We automatically receive your location when you use 
the Service. The Personal Information you provide is used for such purposes as allowing 
you to set up a user account and profile that can be used to interact with other users 
through the Service, improving the content of the Service, customizing the advertising 
and content you see, and communicating with you about specials and new features. We 
may also draw upon this Personal Information in order to adapt the Services of our 
community to your needs, to research the effectiveness of our network and Services, and 
to develop new tools for the community.‖). 
 85 See Security and Permissions, supra note 76.  
 86 See id.  Looking more closely at the foursquare example, users consent to the 
collection of information they ―enter on our service‖ along with anything they ―provide . . 
. in any other way.‖ See Privacy Policy, supra note 84.  What ―other way‖ someone 
might provide data to that service is not clear.  The privacy policy only states that the 
application may collect ―browser information.‖ See id.  What exactly is included in 
―browser information‖ remains unknown. 
 87 See Privacy Policy, supra note 84.  Foursquare amended its privacy policy on 
December 2, 2010 to clarify what it was automatically collecting.  However, this does not 
change value of the above example with regard to other policies. See id. (―Information 
Collected Automatically: When you use the Service, foursquare automatically receives 
and records information on our server logs from your browser or mobile platform, 
including your location, IP address, cookie information, and the page you requested.  We 
treat this data as non-Personal Information, except where we are required to do otherwise 
under applicable law.‖).   
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could conceivably fall within that category.
88
  
 
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF MOBILE PRIVACY REGULATION 
Currently there is no statute specifically regulating access to 
user data.
89
  Instead this information is governed by statutes 
regulating electronic communication
90
 such as the ECPA.
91
  The 
ECPA was enacted to extend the protections of the Federal 
Wiretap Act
92
 to electronic communications.
93
  It addresses three 
types of intrusive conduct: the intercepting of live communication, 
the accessing of stored communications, and the recording of 
―non-content‖ information.94  These three categories are reflected 
in the three titles of the ECPA: Title I–Interception of 
Communications and Related Matters, which regulates access to 
live communications; Title II–Stored Wire and Electronic 
Communications and Transactional Records Access (herein 
―SCA‖), which deals exclusively with access to communications in 
storage;
95
 and Title III – Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices 
 
 88 Providing information to third-party retailers might make the service better, just as 
monitoring a user‘s location to ensure he arrives home safely could as well.  As it is 
currently drafted, the boundaries are unclear. 
 89 For examples of proposed legislation, see Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance 
Act, H.R. 2168, 112th Cong. (2011); Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011, S. 1223, 
112th Cong. (2011); Building Effective Strategies To Promote Responsibility 
Accountability Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards 
Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010).  
 90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (defining ―electronic communication‖ as ―any 
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or 
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce‖). 
 91 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
 92 The Federal Wiretap Act was codified at the same time as Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).  
 93 S. Rep. No. 99-F541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. 
 94 See id. at 3557, 3600. 
 95 Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2006)). 
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(―the Pen Register Statute‖), which sets limitations on the access to 
non-content information.
96
 
Each of the ECPA‘s three titles has its own standard that 
controls access to communications within that class.  Title I, which 
modified the Federal Wiretap Act, utilizes the highest standard.  It 
requires that the government obtain a warrant, upon a showing of 
probable cause that the information to be seized is evidence of a 
crime.
97
  Title II, the SCA, uses a lower standard.  Under the SCA, 
the government need only show ―specific and articulable facts‖ 
that the stored information sought is ―relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.‖98  Lastly, if the information 
sought falls under Title III, the Pen Register Statute, the 
government may obtain a court order for the installation of a pen 
register device upon mere ―certification‖ that the information 
sought is ―relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.‖99 
Under this three-tiered structure, how a piece of information is 
treated depends on how it is classified.  The dividing line between 
Titles I, II and III is designed to mirror the amount of privacy an 
individual can reasonably expect in communications that fall 
within each class.
100
  Understanding what courts consider a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is the first step in understanding 
the ECPA‘s overall structure. 
 
 96 Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2006)). 
 97 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use 
of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, & for Geographic Location Info., 497 
F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (D.P.R. 2007); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1) (the traditional 
warrant requirement). 
 98 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, 
& for Geographic Location Info., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 304. 
 99 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2006).  
 100 See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 
2010) (―Courts, however, have long held that different communications hardware and 
technologies carry different reasonable expectations of privacy.‖). 
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A. Katz and the Expectation of Privacy in Electronic 
Communications 
Much of our modern conception of privacy is grounded in the 
Fourth Amendment‘s mandate that individuals ―shall be secure in 
their person, houses, papers and effects‖ from unreasonable 
government intrusion.
101
  Though it may sound like a blanket grant 
of protection, the scope of the Fourth Amendment is actually 
limited.  Katz v. United States,
102
 a wiretap case, established that 
people are protected from unwarranted government intrusion only 
in situations where: (1) they have a subjective expectation of 
privacy; and (2) that expectation is one society is prepared to 
recognize as ―reasonable.‖103  Since only ―reasonable‖ 
expectations of privacy will be honored, for information to receive 
protection it must meet this threshold. 
Applying the Katz test to modern communications is often a 
multi-step process.  Most communications can be broken down 
into component parts, each of which must be addressed separately 
within the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.
104
 For 
example, a landline phone call can be split into two pieces, the 
number dialed and the conversation that follows.  As each of these 
contains distinct information, the level of privacy an individual can 
reasonably expect will be different for each component.
105
 
In following this method, ECPA treats the phone number and 
conversation differently.  The phone number receives very little 
protection.
106
  The conversation however, is almost sacred.
107
  
Because the level of privacy one expects in the content of the 
phone call is much higher, Title I of ECPA requires a warrant 
before law enforcement can gain access to a phone conversation.
108
  
 
 101 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 102 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 103 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 104 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979). 
 105 Id. at 742. 
 106 See id. (explaining that phone numbers are subject to less protection because ―we 
doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers 
they dial.‖). 
 107 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (explaining that an individual is ―entitled to assume that his 
conversation is not being intercepted.‖). 
 108 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006). 
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Compared to the mere ―certification‖ law enforcement needs to 
access a phone number under Title III,
109
 the difference is 
considerable. 
In many situations, however, the dividing line is not so clear.  
The Katz test recognizes that not all communications within the 
same class should be entitled to the same expectation of privacy.
110
  
Instead, a factual inquiry into the circumstances surrounding how a 
method of communication is used is often warranted.
111
  However, 
regardless of where something falls within the ECPA, individuals 
lose any reasonable expectation of privacy they may have in 
information that is knowingly disclosed to the public.
112
 In a 
mobile app context, this means that once an individual chooses to 
disclose certain information to an application by accepting a 
requested permission, he loses whatever expectation of privacy he 
may have previously had.  Once a permission is accepted, it does 
not matter whether a user believes his information is not public.  
Even if a subjective expectation of privacy previously existed, that 
expectation becomes less reasonable once that information is 
public.
113
  In this way privacy after Katz takes into consideration 
the level of access of each piece of information.  Courts charged 
with applying the test must distinguish between situations in which 
the same method of communication was used differently.
114
 
Since a government intrusion must infringe on both an 
individual‘s subjective expectation of privacy and one society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable, how ―private‖ (or public) an 
individual thinks he has made his activity is not dispositive.
115
  The 
 
 109 Id. § 3122(b)(2).  
 110 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.5. 
 111 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (―Fourth 
Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant 
generalizations.‖ (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 
(1986))). 
 112 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (―What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.‖).   
 113 See id. 
 114 For example a cell phone conversation that takes place in a closed telephone booth 
may be treated differently than one that occurs on a crowded city bus. See id. at 351.  
 115 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (―[T]he test of legitimacy is not 
whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly private activity, but instead whether 
the government‘s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by 
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societal expectation also has value.
116
  Thus, if society considers 
something to be private, it is likely that an individual would be 
justified in expecting privacy in that instance.  This concept is 
critical to a court‘s understanding of a new technology because 
there is no established precedent to guide its analysis. 
Society‘s expectation of privacy is higher when dealing with a 
new technology that is not ―generally available to the public.‖117  
The Supreme Court has addressed a range of new technologies 
over time, from aerial mapping cameras
118
 to thermal imaging 
devices.
119
  In each case, the Court has assessed the reasonableness 
of an individual‘s expectation of privacy by looking at how 
accessible that technology was to the general public.
120
  In this 
context, access to the technology is directly related to the ability to 
access certain information.  Arguably, the more common a 
technology is, the more likely it is to be used to collect 
information, and therefore the less reasonable it is for one to expect 
that his actions will remain hidden.
121
 
 
the Fourth Amendment.‖ (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 116 Many cases in which the defendants have done everything possible to conceal their 
behavior are still decided against an expectation of privacy. See id. at 211–13 (―It can 
reasonably be assumed that the 10-foot fence was placed to conceal the marijuana crop 
from at least street-level views. . . . Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from 
the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on top of a truck or two-level bus.‖); see also 
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 241 (1986) (―Short of erecting a roof 
over the Midland complex, Dow has, as the Court states, undertaken ‗elaborate‘ 
precautions to secure the facility from unwelcome intrusions.‖). 
 117 See Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238. 
 118 Id. at 231. 
 119 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). 
 120 Id. at 34 (―We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information 
regarding the interior of the home . . . constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the 
technology in question is not in general public use.‖); see also Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 
231 (―The photographs at issue in this case are essentially like those commonly used in 
mapmaking.  Any person with an airplane and an aerial camera could readily duplicate 
them.‖); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (―In an age where private and commercial flight in the 
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana 
plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an 
altitude of 1,000 feet.‖).  
 121 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (―[T]he technology enabling human flight has exposed to 
public view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the 
house and its curtilage that once were private.‖). But see Dow Chem. 476 U.S. at 238 
(―[S]urveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment 
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This analysis also cuts the other way.  Revealing something to 
the public ordinarily subjects it to a lower expectation of privacy.  
However, when technology is involved in data collection, one must 
also examine the method of surveillance under the general 
accessibility standard.
122
  Therefore, in this context, the use of 
certain technology may create a reasonable expectation of privacy 
where one previously would not have reasonably expected it.
123
 
This ―method of surveillance‖ standard, as applied to modern 
technology, is derived from Kyllo v. United States.
124
  In Kyllo, law 
enforcement used a thermal imaging device to observe the relative 
heat levels inside a house.
125
  While the information they collected, 
thermal radiation, was publicly available, the technology they used 
was not.
126
  Were the traditional Katz rational to apply, this public 
information would not be subject to any reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
127
  The Court, however, focused instead on the technology 
used to collect that information.  It reasoned that even if Kyllo 
could expect that the heat leaving his house was public, he would 
not reasonably expect that a thermal imager would be waiting 
outside.
128
 
The import of Kyllo is that the use of technology during 
surveillance may weaken or reverse the effect of public disclosure 
under the Katz analysis.  Society may not justifiably impose a 
lower expectation of privacy on a communication simply because 
it was made in a public place.
129
  The method of surveillance and 
 
not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be 
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.‖). 
 122 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (―It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance 
of technology.‖). 
 123 Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238 (suggesting that the ―use of highly sophisticated 
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public . . . might be constitutionally 
proscribed absent a warrant‖); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (―But what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.‖ (citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960))). 
 124 533 U.S. at 34. 
 125 Id. at 30. 
 126 Id. at 34. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Cf. id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
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how that public information was collected are equally important.
130
  
Location is only one factor in the analysis. 
This modification to the Katz standard is extremely important 
in the context of mobile privacy.  Just as a landline phone call can 
be divided into two components,
131
 mobile communications may 
be subdivided into smaller parts as well.  The data stream from a 
cell phone may contain many different types of information.  It 
may contain audio from a phone call, e-mail, and data related to a 
user‘s current location.132  Following an application of the hybrid 
Katz/Kyllo test, the reasonable expectation of privacy in each of 
those communications would be determined separately, by 
evaluating the general accessibility of the technology required to 
capture each stream.
133
  The technology required to intercept a 
public phone call, the human ear, is generally accessible to the 
public.  The technology required to intercept an e-mail from a data 
stream is not.  While it may be reasonable that another person 
within earshot could overhear a conversation taking place, that 
does not affect an individual‘s expectation of privacy regarding the 
e-mail communication his phone is simultaneously receiving.
134
 
The three titles of ECPA separate communications not just by 
the level of privacy an individual can reasonably expect but also by 
the characteristics of the communication itself.
135
  In determining 
the nature of a given communication there are three remaining 
 
 130 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2 (―The police might, for example, learn how many people 
are in a particular house by setting up year-round surveillance; but that does not make 
breaking and entering to find out the same information lawful.‖). 
 131 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (―Although petitioner‘s conduct 
may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct 
was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he 
dialed.‖). 
 132 See Jenna Worthham, Cell Phones Now Used More for Data Than for Calls, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/ 
technology/personaltech/14talk.html. 
 133 See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 3773994, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 
2010). 
 134 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (―But what he sought to exclude when he entered the 
booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.  He did not shed his right to do 
so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.‖). 
 135 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
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questions a court must ask: (1) was the communication considered 
―stored‖ or ―in transmission‖ when it was intercepted?; (2) does 
the communication contain ―content‖ or ―non-content‖ 
information; and (3) is there an exception provided for by the 
statute? 
1. Is it Stored or in Transmission? 
The ECPA treats stored electronic communications differently 
than communications that are in transmission.  The statutory 
language is clear: Title I of the ECPA covers only the interception 
of electronic communications
136
 while Title II deals only with 
stored communications.
137
  Yet despite this clarity courts are still 
divided on how this language should apply. 
Many courts find that Title I and Title II of the ECPA are 
mutually exclusive.
138
  These courts focus on the distinction 
between ―interception‖ and ―access,‖ and find that it is impossible 
for an electronic communication to violate both provisions.
139
  The 
rationale is that the ECPA defines the two states of an electronic 
communication separately, and because the word ―transfer‖ only 
describes the transmission and not the ―electronic storage,‖ the two 
titles are discrete.
140
  A communication therefore must fit into one 
of the two categories; there is no middle ground. 
 
 136 See id. 
 137 See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006) (applying to whoever ―obtains, alters, or 
prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic 
storage‖). 
 138 See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 890 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 
1058–59 (9th Cir. 1998)); In re Double Click Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 
507 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 
817, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2000); State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Financial Services, 
Inc., 909 F. Supp. 137, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 139 See Konop, 302 F.3d at 876–79. 
 140 Id. at 877 (―Congress‘ use of the word ‗transfer‘ in the definition of ‗electronic 
communication,‘ and its omission in that definition of the phrase ‗any electronic storage 
of such communication‘ . . . reflects that Congress did not intend for ‗intercept‘ to apply 
to ‗electronic communications‘ when those communications are in ‗electronic storage‘‖ 
(internal citations omitted)); Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 386 (D. Del. 1997) 
(―[B]y including the electronic storage of wire communications within the definition of 
such communications but declining to do the same for electronic communications—
Congress sufficiently evinced its intent to make acquisitions of electronic 
LEVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
212 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:191 
Similarly, these courts also apply a narrow definition of 
―interception‖141 and find that the Federal Wiretap Act covers only 
electronic communications that are acquired contemporaneously 
with their transmission.
142
  Once an electronic communication 
passes into storage, even temporarily, it switches over to Title II.  
Because a stored communication can no longer be ―intercepted‖ it 
is governed by the requirements of the SCA. 
At least one court, the Seventh Circuit, has rejected this 
interpretation of the statute.
143
  In United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 
the Seventh Circuit examined the relationship between the Wiretap 
Act and SCA as they apply to the interception of e-mails.
144
  The 
case arose from a situation in which office politics had gone too 
far.  Mr. Szymuszkiewicz feared that he was going to lose his 
job.
145
  To obtain more information, he sneaked on to his boss‘s 
computer and configured Microsoft Outlook to forward him copies 
of all the messages his boss received.
146
 
Szymuszkiewicz was charged under the Wiretap Act for 
illegally intercepting his boss‘s e-mails.147 Szymuszkiewicz 
contested the charge as a matter of timing, arguing that 
 
communications unlawful under [the Wiretap Act] only if they occur contemporaneously 
with their transmissions.‖); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (―[I]ntercepting an electronic communication . . . means acquiring the transfer of 
data. . . . [T]he definitions thus imply . . . that the acquisition of the data be simultaneous 
with the original transmission of the data.‖). See also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 
1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that a narrow definition of intercept is appropriate in 
the context of electronic communications).   
 141 See Steve Jackson Games Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th Cir. 
1994) (defining the term ―intercept‖ to mean an acquisition contemporaneous with 
transmission). 
 142 See Konop, 302 F.3d at 878 (―In cases concerning ‗electronic communications‘—the 
definition of which specifically includes ‗transfers‘ and specifically excludes ‗storage‘—
the ‗narrow‘ definition of ‗intercept‘ fits like a glove; it is natural to except non-
contemporaneous retrievals from the scope of the Wiretap Act.‖ (quoting United States v. 
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998))).  
 143 See generally United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 144 Id. at 703. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, No. 07-CR-171, 2009 WL 1873657, at *1 
(E.D. Wis. June 30, 2009) (Szymuszkiewicz was charged with three counts of 
intercepting an electronic communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)).  
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interception must be defined narrowly to mean ―contemporaneous 
with transmission.‖148  According to Szymuszkiewicz, alleging a 
violation of the Wiretap Act was inappropriate because his boss‘s 
computer did not forward the e-mails until after they were 
received.
149
  Under this narrow reading of the statute, his e-mail 
surveillance efforts did not violate the SCA because, as he argued, 
if the e-mail was forwarded after it was stored on the host 
computer then it could not be intercepted.
150
 
The court rejected this interpretation for two reasons.  First, the 
plain language of the statute provides no timing requirement for 
interception.
151
  This argument is similar to the one advanced in 
Judge Reinhardt‘s opinion in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc.,152 a 
case that also interprets Internet privacy.  Judge Reinhardt, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, pointed out that the 
ECPA defines ―intercept‖ as the ―aural or other acquisition of the 
contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through 
the use of any electronic . . . device.‖153  Courts that apply a narrow 
definition of ―intercept‖ appear to ignore this language and define 
interception differently.
154
 
 
 148 Id. at *7. 
 149 Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 703. 
 150 The idea that interception must be contemporaneous with transmission is derived 
from an earlier case, United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976). See Konop 
v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  Turk interpreted an earlier version of the Wiretap Act, before the 
amendments made by ECPA included electronic communications. Id.  Because the 
statute has since been revised, the language the Turk court relied on no longer exists thus 
overruling the requirement that interception be contemporaneous with transmission. Id.  
 151 Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706 (―There is no timing requirement in the Wiretap 
Act, and judges ought not add to statutory definitions.‖ (citing Lockhart v. United States, 
546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005))). 
 152 Konop, 302 F.3d at 887 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 153 Id. at 876 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 154 See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 
1994). 
Prior to the 1986 amendment by the ECPA, the Wiretap Act defined 
‗intercept‘ as the ‗aural acquisition‘ of the contents of wire or oral 
communications through the use of a device. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) 
(1968).  The ECPA amended this definition to include the ‗aural or 
other acquisition of the contents of . . . wire, electronic, or oral 
communications. . . .‘ 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1986) (emphasis added 
for new terms). The significance of the addition of the words ‗or 
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The court‘s second reason for rejecting Szymuszkiewicz‘s 
argument focused on the differences between the transmission of 
electronic and wire communications.  Wire communications, like 
telephones, use circuit switching technology.
155
  Circuit switching 
creates a single electronic pathway or circuit between the devices 
involved in a call.
156
  Alternatively, electronic communications use 
―packet switching‖ to send data.157  ―Packet switching‖ breaks a 
message down into small packets of data.
158
  These packets contain 
not only information about the content of the message, but also 
routing information, like an address, that tells the packet where it 
has to go.
159
  Each packet travels independently.
160
  The network 
then arranges and resends the packets as necessary so that at least 
one copy of each packet (there may be many) reaches its final 
destination.
161
  Once all of the packets for a given message are 
received, a computer then uses a specific protocol
162
 to reassemble 
the packets and create the entire message.
163
 
The Szymuszkiewicz court reasoned that because of these 
technological differences, it would be impossible to apply a timing 
 
other‘ in the 1986 amendment to the definition of ‗intercept‘ becomes 
clear when the definitions of ‗aural‘ and ‗electronic communication‘ 
are examined; electronic communications (which include the non-
voice portions of wire communications), as defined by the Act, 
cannot be acquired aurally. 
Id.  
 155 See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 704. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. 
 158 See Lee Copeland, Quick Study: Packet-Switched vs. Circuit Switched Networks, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 20, 2000), http://www.computerworld.com/s/ 
article/41904/Packet_Switched_vs._Circuit_Switched_Networks; see also Paul Baran 
and the Origins of the Internet, RAND CORPORATION, http://www.rand.org/about/history/ 
baran.list.html (last modified Mar. 28, 2011). 
 159 See Copeland, supra note 158. 
 160 See id.  
 161 See id.  
 162 A ―protocol‖ is a standard language by which computers communicate with one 
another.  For instance, there are three e-mail protocols that govern how an e-mail 
message can be transmitted and received—POP, IMAP, and SMTP. See Vic Laurie, 
Computer Protocols: TCP, IP, UDP, POP, SMTP, HTTP, FTP and More, COMPUTER 
EDUC., http://vlaurie.com/computers2/Articles/protocol.htm (last updated July 13, 2011, 
5:17 PM). 
 163 See Copeland, supra note 158.  
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requirement to information sent over a packet switched network.
164
 
Interception could never take place contemporaneously with 
transmission because there is no continuous connection between 
the two ends of an electronic communication.
165
  Following a 
narrow definition of ―interception‖ in the context of electronic 
communications therefore would produce conflicting and 
inconsistent results.
166
 
To further highlight this argument, the court focused on Voice 
Over Internet Protocol (―VoIP‖) services that allow users to make 
telephone calls over the Internet.
167
  These services deliver phone 
calls through packet switched networks rather than the traditional 
circuit switched telephone lines.
168
  A reading of the Wiretap Act 
that protects against interception only if it is contemporaneous with 
transmission ignores VoIP phone calls and criminalizes only those 
made through traditional circuit switching channels.
169
  Given that 
the Wiretap Act protects the content of a phone call,
170
 this surely 
would be an unintended result.  If the statute protects the content of 
a phone call, then when that call was intercepted should be 
irrelevant.
171
 
 
 164 See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (2010).  
 165 Id. at 705 (―Szymuszkiewicz‘s understanding of ‗interception‘ as ‗catching a thing 
in flight‘ is sensible enough for football, but for email there is no single ‗thing‘ that flies 
straight from sender to recipient.  When sender and recipient are connected by a single 
circuit, and the spy puts a ‗tap‘ in between, the football analogy makes some sense . . . 
For e-mail, however, there are no dedicated circuits.  There are only packets, segments of 
a message that take different routes at different times.‖). 
 166 Id. at 705 (―The difference between circuit-switch and packet-switch transmission 
methods thus is irrelevant under § 2510.‖ (citing 18 U.S.C. §2510(4) which defines 
―interception‖ as ―aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 
communication through the use of any electronic . . . device.‖ (emphasis added))).   
 167 See id. at 706.  
 168 See generally In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4869 (2004) (reviewing 
Internet telephony in comparison to traditional landline technology).  
 169 See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706.  
 170 See id. at 706; see also Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Ali v. Douglas Cable Communc‘n, 929 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Kan. 1996); United States. v. 
Borch, 695 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Mich. 1988).  
 171 See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706.  
Many phone calls today are made by digitizing speech and 
transferring the result by packet switching.  Transmission by packet 
switching allows for multiple simultaneous messages over a single 
circuit and so is cheaper than circuit switching.  The adoption of 
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The court extended its reasoning to the e-mail transmissions.
172
  
If the Wiretap Act would prevent someone from intercepting a call 
made using VoIP, then it should also prevent someone from 
intercepting an e-mail.  Since both use the same protocol to 
transmit information, any requirement that e-mails be intercepted 
as they were being sent would be equally inappropriate.
173
  A 
different interpretation of the statute would create a conflict and 
allow e-mails to be read in some situations but not in others. 
Addressing Szymuszkiewicz‘s argument that he had been 
charged under the wrong statute, the court also held that both the 
Wiretap Act and the SCA could apply to a single communication 
and that nothing prohibits both sections from applying at the same 
time.
174
  ―Overlapping criminal statutes are nothing new,‖ and the 
court held that it is appropriate to allow overlapping set of statutes 
in a civil context as well.
175
 
The SCA does not explicitly repeal any part of the Wiretap 
Act, and the court held that each statute is therefore ―fully 
enforceable according to its own terms.‖176  This reasoning 
recognizes and accounts for the differences between electronic and 
 
packet switching is not limited to ‗voice over IP‘ services such as 
Vonage or Skype.  The fourth-generation protocol for mobile phones, 
being introduced this year in the United States, is one part of an effort 
to transmit all voice communications by IP (‗Internet Protocol‘, a 
packet-switched method) before many more years have passed. See 
3rd Generation Partnership Project, All–IP Network (AIPN) 
Feasibility Study, Technical Report no. 22.978 rel. 8 (Dec. 2008). 
The ‗interception‘ of a communication sent in packets must be done 
by programming a computer to copy the contents it sends along (and 
reassemble them later), which was exactly what Szymuszkiewicz told 
Infusino‘s computer to do with her incoming emails.  In saying that 
the Wiretap Act‘s definitions treat the acquisition of emails as an 
interception, we ensure that the Act applies to packet-switched phone 
calls too. 
Id. 
 172 Id. at 705.  
 173 Id. at 706. 
 174 Id. at 705 (―We agree with Councilman‟s conclusion on that subject (as well as its 
conclusion that the Stored Communications Act does not repeal any part of the Wiretap 
Act by implication; each statute is fully enforceable according to its own terms).‖).  
 175 Id. at 706. 
 176 Id. at 705. 
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traditional communications, and in so doing removes the conflict 
that arises when a narrow definition of interception is used.  Under 
the Seventh Circuit‘s reasoning, both parts of the ECPA may apply 
to electronic communications while communications that employ 
traditional circuit switching technology need not look further than 
the Wiretap Act. 
2. Is it Content or Not? 
Whether a communication contains content information plays a 
dual role in an ECPA analysis.  On one hand, classifying 
something as non-content data can result in bypassing all privacy 
protections.
177
  On the other hand, classifying something as non-
content data can simply move the information to falling under Title 
III of the ECPA.
178
  While the standard is a low one under Title III, 
requiring only ―certification‖ that the information sought is part of 
an ongoing investigation, those seeking to access information 
under this title must still obtain a court order.
179
  Non-content 
information may be outside the realm of reasonable expectations of 
privacy as defined by Katz, but it still falls within the protective 
language of the ECPA. 
 
 177 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed); United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (holding that when revealing his affairs to another, the depositor 
assumes the risk that business records kept by a bank will be turned over to the 
government); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973) (holding that no 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed in records that were turned over to an 
accountant for tax preparation). But see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) 
(holding that the content of a conversation between petitioner and a government 
informant was not protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
 178 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006) (―the term ‗pen register‘ means a device or process 
which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information 
transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is 
transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of 
any communication‖); Id. § 3127(4) (―the term ‗trap and trace device‘ means a device or 
process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the 
originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information 
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, 
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication‖).  
 179 See id. § 3122(b)(2) (―a certification by the applicant that the information likely to 
be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that 
agency.‖). 
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Courts have only recently applied Title III to location-based 
information.  In the past, the Pen Register Statute only controlled 
access to phone numbers.
180
  However, in 2001, the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT 
Act)
181
 expanded the statutory definition of a pen register 
device.
182
  This new definition made it possible to record non-
content information sent as part of an electronic or wire 
communication.
183
  Law enforcement took advantage of this 
change and, following the PATRIOT Act‘s amendment of ECPA, 
began trying to obtain location-based information via pen register 
devices.
184
  By classifying location-based information as falling 
under Title III, law enforcement is able to avoid the higher 
standards imposed by both Title I and Title II. 
There was, however, one significant roadblock to this analysis.  
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(―CALEA‖) expressly limited law enforcement access to location-
based information.
185
  The statute was designed to ensure that as 
telecommunications networks evolved, law enforcement would 
continue to have access to the information necessary to do its 
job.
186
  Telecommunications companies needed to maintain their 
networks in such a way that it was possible to access ―call-
identifying information,‖ along with ―electronic messaging‖ and 
―information services‖ used for sharing among computer 
devices.
187
  This requirement that information systems remain 
accessible to law enforcement is balanced by the limitations placed 
 
 180 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1 (―A pen register is a mechanical device that records 
the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the 
dial on the telephone is released.  It does not overhear oral communications and does not 
indicate whether calls are actually completed.‖ (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 
434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977))). 
 181 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3121). 
 182 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006). 
 183 See id. § 3127.  
 184 See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 185 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 
108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 186 H.R. REP. NO. 103-827 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3489.  
 187 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-02 (2006). 
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on the scope of law enforcement access.  Recognizing that 
location-based information is more sensitive than the phone 
numbers an individual dials, the statute dictates that ―information 
acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap 
and trace devices . . . shall not include any information that may 
disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the 
extent that location may be determined from the telephone 
number).‖188 
Several courts have interpreted the phrase ―solely pursuant‖ to 
mean that the Pen Register Statute may be combined with some 
additional statutory authority to allow recording beyond what is 
explicitly listed in the statute.
189
  Courts often rely on the SCA for 
this additional authority.
190
  Though it was intended to apply only 
to stored communications, the SCA authorizes the government to 
require a provider of electronic communications to disclose ―a 
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or 
customer of such service.‖191  This language is very similar to that 
used by the Supreme Court in addressing non-content information 
in other customer/subscriber situations.
192
  Just like bank records or 
telephone numbers are non-content subscriber information, cell-
 
 188 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 189 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use 
of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Info., 
497 F. Supp. 2d. 301, 308 (D.P.R. 2007) (―[N]o such unclarity exists on the face of the 
statute.  In particular, I do not see how the phrase ‗solely pursuant‘ in Section 1002(a)(2) 
can be read so as not to convey the meaning that the Pen Register Statute may be used in 
combination with some other authority for the purpose the government seeks.‖); see also 
In re: Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a 
Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452, nn.11–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (listing all of 
the cases that have decided for and against this hybrid use of the statute). 
 190 See In re: Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53. 
 191 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006).  
 192 The language of this section of the statute very closely mirrors the exception for 
―business records‖ of other non-content information cases.  See United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (―On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not 
respondent‘s ‗private papers.‘ . . . [R]espondent can assert neither ownership nor 
possession.  Instead, these are the business records of the banks.‖). 
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site information may be considered a ―record or other information‖ 
with regard to the use of a cell phone.
193
 
Users automatically disclose their location to the cell phone 
company every time they turn on their phones.
194
  Once a phone 
connects to a tower the cell phone company knows that user‘s 
location.
195
  If cell phone companies store this information as 
traditional phone companies keep records of the phone numbers 
dialed, then a list of that user‘s locations falls within the overlap 
between the two statutes.  However, the situation changes when 
dealing with prospective, i.e. real-time, location-based data that is 
not yet recorded. 
Courts that are in favor of treating cell-site information as 
―stored‖ data follow the narrow reading of interception that was 
rejected by the Szymuszkiewicz court.
196
  These courts treat real-
time location-based information as stored data because this 
information is received by the cell phone service provider and 
recorded on its system momentarily before it is forwarded to law 
enforcement officials.
197
  As the SCA applies to communications 
in temporary storage, location-based information falls within its 
reach.
198
 
Courts in opposition to this reading point to several 
weaknesses.  In analyzing the SCA, these courts argue that nothing 
in the statute contemplates ongoing surveillance in real-time, but 
rather that the SCA seeks only to control the circumstance under 
which the government can compel the disclosure of existing 
communications.
199
  Unlike the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register 
 
 193 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical 
Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-897 (NGG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93494, at *18–19 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011). 
 194 See supra Part I.A. 
 195 See supra Part I.B. 
 196 See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 705–07 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 197 See In re: Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 198 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) (2006) (defining electronic storage as ―any temporary, 
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic 
transmission thereof‖). 
 199 See In re Application of the U.S. for Orders Authorizing the Installation & Use of 
Pen Registers & Caller Identification Devices on Tel. No. [Sealed] & [Sealed], 416 F. 
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Statute which are expressly designed to allow real-time 
surveillance, the SCA contains no limitation on the amount of time 
that law enforcement, pursuant to a court order, can maintain its 
investigation.
200
  Perhaps the SCA‘s minimal procedural 
safeguards reveal Congress‘ intent.  If the purpose of the SCA is to 
allow for real-time surveillance, as permitted under the Wiretap 
Act and Pen Register Statute, Congress could have included some 
restriction on duration as it did in the other two sections. 
While both sides present good arguments, it is currently 
unclear where location-based information stands within the Title 
III framework.  This is further complicated by the observation that 
if the SCA is applicable to location-based information and is 
sufficient to fill the gap in the Pen Register Statute then it is 
unclear why location-based information is not governed by the 
SCA‘s higher standards of access. 
3. Is it an Exception to the ECPA? 
Even if a piece of information falls perfectly within the reach 
of one of the three titles, it may not be protected because it is 
excepted from the ECPA entirely.  There are a handful of 
exceptions to the statute, available to private parties and the 
government, that allow for the disclosure of intercepted 
information.
201
 
Some of these exceptions are granted to allow for the day-to-
day operation of the telecommunication industry.
202
  Keeping in 
mind that individuals can reasonably expect the content of a phone 
 
Supp. 2d 390, 395 n.7 (D. Md. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. For an Order (1) 
Authorizing The Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing 
Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005); In re Application For Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device With Cell Site Location 
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 760 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 200 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
 201 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii). 
 202 For example, the protections of the ECPA do not apply to the activity of any officer, 
employee, or agent of a wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are 
used in transmitting these communications, from intercepting or disclosing information 
―in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a 
necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or 
property of the provider of that service.‖ Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
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call to remain private, instances still exist in which the telephone 
service provider may need to listen in on a user‘s conversation.  
For example, a communications service provider may need to 
perform maintenance or quality control assessments that require 
listening in on a certain line.  Accordingly, the ECPA contains an 
exception for service provider activity that aims to balance the 
interest of both the wire communication provider and the paying 
customer.
203
  However this is only a limited exception for service 
providers, and its aim is to maintain individual privacy in 
situations not related to the necessary maintenance and upkeep of 
the communication system.
204
  This exception protects phone 
companies that provide a valuable service from lawsuits related to 
activity necessary to carry on everyday operations, but allows users 
to continue making phone calls confident that there is not some 
idle operator listening in on the line. 
Other exceptions are also necessary to protect public 
information.  For example, the ECPA removes from the 
protections of the Wiretap Act, the SCA, and the Pen Register 
Statute any electronic communications that are ―readily accessible‖ 
to the general public.
205
  This dovetails with the rationale of Katz 
and the disclosure cases.
206
  Once a communication is made public, 
an individual has no expectation that this communication will 
remain private.
207
  The ECPA recognizes this change in privacy 
and removes public information from the scope of its protection.
208
 
The most important exception to the ECPA, at least for the 
purposes of this Note, allows for the disclosure of a 
 
 203 See id. § 2511(2)(a). 
 204 See id. 
 205 Id. § 2511(2)(g).  
 206 See supra Part II.  
 207 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).  
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information 
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed. 
Id. 
 208 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g). 
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communication if one party has consented to it.
209
  Mirroring the 
language used in the disclosure cases,
210
 the ECPA removes from 
the scope of its protection information for which: (1) the observer 
was a ―party‖ to the communication;211 and (2) one of the parties 
has given consent to its interception.
212
  This also mirrors the Katz 
analysis in that information disclosed to another party is subject to 
a lower expectation of privacy given that if a person consents to 
the interception, whether by inviting a friend over,
213
 filling out a 
form,
214
 or consciously providing information in some other way, 
he cannot then turn around and revoke that disclosure.
215
 
The methods of sharing that the exception contemplated, 
however, are rather traditional.  Technology has recently 
complicated the possible ways that users may voluntarily share 
their current locations.  In applying the existing framework to 
location-based mobile services, sharing one‘s information through 
an app could likely be considered a form of consent.  But unlike 
disclosing a secret to a friend or filling out a survey, in a digital 
 
 209 Id. § 2511(2)(d). 
 210 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 
(1966) (holding that the giving of consent to an informant‘s presence is valid because the 
misplaced confidence that one will not reveal wrongdoing does not create a legitimate 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
 211 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).  
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting 
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication where such person is a party to the communication or 
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior 
consent to such interception unless such communication is 
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any 
State. 
Id. 
 212 Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (2006) (―subsection (a) of this section does not 
apply with respect to conduct authorized . . . (2) by a user of that [wire or electronic 
communication] service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user‖) 
(emphasis added). 
 213 See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.  
 214 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 215 The situation where one enters personal information on a website and clicks submit 
is less troublesome in this regard. See id. at 502 n.8. 
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world it is not always obvious what the user is consenting to and 
perhaps more importantly, where that consent begins and ends. 
Data collection on the Internet and on a mobile phone may 
occur without a user ever knowing it.
216
  Many websites for 
example use a small file called a cookie
217
 to collect information 
about those who visit their site.
218
  In theory cookies can be 
helpful.  A cookie can ―store useful information such as 
usernames, passwords, and preferences, making it easier for users 
to access Web pages in an efficient manner.‖219  They can also be 
harmful, when for example they are used to store and report 
information from a user‘s browsing history to a third party.220  In 
this and similar situations, a user may believe that the information 
stored is private.
221
 
Complicating the consent analysis is the possibility that in a 
digital context the user may not know the third party receiving his 
information exists.  This is common in situations that involve 
mobile and web-based advertising.  Usually there are at least three 
parties to such an information transfer: the user, the website, and 
an unaffiliated advertising network.
222
  The website and the ad 
network likely have an agreement that allows the ad network to 
access information about the website‘s users.  The ad network 
places a cookie on a user‘s computer when he visits a customer‘s 
website.  The cookie collects the user‘s information which is then 
funneled off to the ad network.  In exchange for access to this 
information, the ad network supplies the website with advertising 
that is targeted to its users based on the information it collects from 
the cookies.  Because a user is not a party to this agreement, the ad 
 
 216 See generally Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Apple, Google Collect 
User Data, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703983704576277101723453610.html.  
 217 Cookies are text files that a website sends to a user‘s computer that allow the 
website to track his movements. See Adam L. Penenberg, Why Web Surfers Love To Hate 
Cookies, SLATE MAG. (Nov. 7, 2005, 4:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2129656/. 
 218 See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03. 
 219 Id. 
 220 See id. 
 221 The class of users that initiated the suit in DoubleClick alleged that the cookies were 
reporting names, email addresses, home and business addresses, phone numbers, searches 
performed, and websites visited. See id. at 503. 
 222 See generally id.  This analysis is modeled on the facts of the DoubleClick case.  
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network is effectively collecting data using a cookie that the 
website, and not the web user, gave it permission to install. 
Under the ECPA it is not clear if authorization is required from 
the actual end user;
223
 the agreement between the website and the 
ad network may be sufficient for purposes of the exception.  In 
light of the Katz privacy test, the ad network‘s actions are justified 
by the rationale of the disclosure cases.  Once a user discloses 
information to a third party, his reasonable expectation of privacy 
decreases.
224
  If the user consented to the website‘s collection of 
his information, which arguably he did by visiting the site,
225
 then 
the website can authorize the third party ad network to step in. 
 This disclosure-based rational is mirrored by the ECPA.  
Under the SCA, because the information collected was intended 
for the visited website, that website may then authorize whoever it 
wants to access the data.
226
  Similarly because the website was a 
―party‖ to the original communication, it is free to intercept data 
under the Wiretap Act as well.
227
  If the website is authorized to 
intercept the data, arguably it should be allowed to pass that 
information on to another party.
228
 
 
 223 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006). 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting 
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication where such person is a party to the communication or 
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior 
consent to such interception unless such communication is 
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any 
State. 
      Id. 
 224 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 225 See Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (―By the 
very act of sending a communication over the Internet, the party expressly consents to the 
recording of the message.‖). 
 226 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2006). 
 227 See id. § 2511(2)(d). 
 228 In reaching its conclusion, the court seems to ignore where the ad network appears 
in the transmission.  In order to supply content, the ad network must step in at some point 
between the user requesting the web address and the loading of the page.  The ad network 
therefore likely gets some information about the user from the cookie before the site 
actually loads.  If this is the case, the information was not transferred from the website to 
the ad network but instead directly from the user‘s computer. See In re DoubleClick Inc. 
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (―DoubleClick acts as an 
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While this exception seems broad, it is not absolute.  The 
Wiretap Act provides a fallback provision that will invalidate the 
consent and therefore the exception if the information is 
intercepted ―for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious 
act.‖229  However, this is a very difficult standard to meet.  The 
web user must show intent and demonstrate that the desire to 
commit a tortious act was the primary motivation or at least a 
determinative factor in the ad network‘s actions.230  It is not 
enough to simply prove that the defendant committed a tort or 
crime—in this case a privacy violation.231  Instead, to obtain relief, 
a user must prove that the ad network collected his data because it 
wanted to commit a bad act.  Thus, even if the user can prove that 
he was harmed by the collection of data,
232
 that alone is not 
sufficient for relief under the ECPA. 
III. CONFLICTING RESULTS 
The ECPA attempts to base the protection it provides on the 
relative levels of privacy individuals expect for their 
information.
233
  This approach of varied treatment in many ways 
codifies the Katz view of privacy.
234
  However, it should not be the 
sole foundation for defining mobile privacy. 
Mobile communications are fundamentally different from the 
traditional communications Katz addressed, both in how they are 
used and transmitted.  In mobile communications oftentimes users 
are not telling a secret to a friend or filling out a survey—the kind 
of disclosure Katz envisioned—but instead are sending a rich data 
stream from their mobile device with several different types of 
information; location-based information is just one category.  
 
intermediary between host Web sites and Web sites seeking to place banner 
advertisements.‖). 
 229 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
 230 See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514–15 (quoting United States v. 
Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 841–42 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
 231 See id. at 516. 
 232 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2006) 
(examining the harm that electronic surveillance creates). 
 233 See supra Part II. 
 234 See id. 
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Rather than address these communications separately, the ECPA 
treats all digital information sent from a user‘s mobile device the 
same.
235
  To enable the Katz rationale to fit, the ECPA: (1) 
incorrectly categorizes information as stored or in transmission; (2) 
incorrectly assumes that location is non-content information; and 
(3) misapplies the consent exceptions within a mobile context. 
A. The ECPA Incorrectly Defines “Stored Communication” 
One of the major difficulties courts face when applying the 
ECPA is distinguishing communications that are stored from those 
that are in transmission.
236
  The statute appears to draw the 
distinction based on when and where a communication is 
intercepted.
237
  However, actually applying this ―stored/in 
transmission‖ distinction correctly to digital information proves to 
be almost impossible. 
The stored/in transmission line does not accurately reflect how 
electronic communications are transmitted.
238
  Electronic 
communications have a dual nature.
239
  The packets that carry the 
communication are stored pieces of data.  Yet those packets are 
also in transmission as they are sent to their final location.
240
  The 
ECPA ignores the fact that electronic communications are really 
the product of stored bits of information being transferred and then 
very quickly reassembled to create the final product.  Packet-
switching is fundamentally different than an analog 
communication involving live audio like a telephone conversation.  
In a live conversation the audio is not automatically stored. The 
information transmitted will be lost (except for in the listeners‘ 
memories) unless someone uses a recording device.  Electronic 
communications, like emails, must always be converted into 
packets before they are sent to their final destination, and therefore 
must always be stored as data before they are transmitted.  Thus 
one who intercepts an electronic communication would be 
 
 235 See supra Part II. 
 236 See supra Part II. 
 237 See id. 
 238 See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 239 See id. 
 240 See id.  
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intercepting stored information even though he was doing so while 
it was in transmission. 
Because electronic communications involve the transmission of 
stored information, maintaining the stored/in transmission 
distinction frustrates the purpose of the ECPA.  The Wiretap Act 
was originally designed to prevent the negative consequences of 
real-time surveillance.
241
  Focusing solely on the status of a 
communication at the transmission stage ignores the potential harm 
created by the interception of that message.  The Szymuszkiewicz 
court identified this conflict by examining how its decision would 
impact the classification of VoIP services.
242
  VoIP is a new 
technology that provides an ―old‖ technology function—phone 
calls.  Listening in on phone calls is precisely the kind of harm the 
Wiretap Act was designed to prevent.  If the Wiretap Act only 
applied in situations where interception was contemporaneous with 
transmission, a phone call made using VoIP technology would not 
be protected.
243
  Instead, it would be governed by the rules of the 
SCA and subject to a much lower standard for access along with an 
unlimited time frame of observation.
244
 
The method of transmitting a call, or any other electronic 
communication, should not affect the level of privacy protection it 
receives.  Maintaining the stored/in transmission distinction 
ignores the functional similarities between different 
communications that may logically justify equal protection.  For 
example, VoIP is the functional equivalent of a phone call.
245
  
There is no dispute that the content of a phone call is protected.
246
  
It should not be that an individual loses that protection simply by 
placing a call from something other than a landline.  Regardless of 
 
 241 Solove, supra note 232, at 492–93. 
 242 See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706. 
 243 See supra Part II.  It may be possible to argue otherwise if the person using a VoIP 
service called someone with a traditional landline telephone and that call was tapped 
from the wire connection and not the VoIP end of the call.  However, this argument is 
precisely the point this note stands against.  
 244 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006). 
 245 See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706 (―Transmission by packet switching allows for 
multiple simultaneous messages over a single circuit and so is cheaper than circuit 
switching.‖). 
 246 See supra Part II. 
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how the conversation is transmitted, by copper wire or by packets 
of information, the resulting service is the same.  Because a phone 
call on either system provides the same service for the user, society 
would reasonably expect that the privacy afforded to each system 
be the same. As a result, the harm to society of eavesdropping in 
either case is also the same.  These functional similarities and not 
the method of transmission should be used to determine the 
appropriate level of protection. 
The stored/in transmission distinction is particularly important 
to the regulation of location-based mobile services because of the 
way courts have incorporated location-based data into the Pen 
Register Statute.  This determination is very similar to the VoIP 
analogy mentioned above.  Because location-based data is stored 
momentarily during the transmission process, it is subject to the 
lesser protections offered by the SCA.
247
  This, read together with 
the Pen Register Statute, subjects a user‘s current location, 
possibly the most sensitive piece of information, to the lowest level 
of privacy protection.
248
 
Just like the VoIP example, for location-based data it should 
not matter whether there is momentary storage.  The focus should 
instead be on the harm created by the real-time surveillance of a 
user‘s location.  Arguably, this approach is already built into the 
ECPA, and both the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register Statute 
impose time limits and other conditions on situations that involve 
real-time surveillance.
249
  Since the method of transmission, and 
thus how that data may be intercepted, does not affect or alter the 
potential societal harm, the technical method of transmission 
should not affect the amount of protection a communication 
receives. 
 
 247 See supra Part II. 
 248 See supra Part II. 
 249 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006) (―No order entered under this section may authorize or 
approve the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period 
longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event 
longer than thirty days.‖); Id. § 3123(c)(1) (―An order issued under this section shall 
authorize the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device for a period 
not to exceed sixty days.‖).  The SCA does not contemplate real time data and therefore 
does not impose a time limit on government access. 
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B. The Pen Register Statute Incorrectly Assumes Location is Non-
Content Information 
While the language of the Pen Register Statute may allow for a 
hybrid reading in combination with the SCA, that interpretation 
should not be applied to location-based information.  The 
classification of location-based information as non-content data 
does not accurately reflect the public‘s use of that information.  
The Pen Register Statute, which traditionally governed access to 
phone numbers,
250
 imposes a very low hurdle to access only 
because the information it was meant to protect is non-content 
data
251
 that was necessarily disclosed to a third party.
252
  Location-
based user data meets neither of these criteria. 
The way the general public currently uses location-based data 
supports the argument that such data is content.  Users who permit 
location-based services to share their location with others can 
choose when they will allow that information to be shared.  There 
is no default public setting for one‘s location, as there is with a 
phone number or mailing address in a public directory.
253
  Except 
pursuant to a court order, any sharing of information is at the 
user‘s discretion.  It appears, therefore, that users value location-
based information more than they do other public information.  
Users share such information only at the times and places that they 
choose to.  And furthermore, when the disclosure of a user‘s 
location is linked to a social network or media outlet, the sharing 
of that information creates content for other users. 
 
 250 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979).  
 251 See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (―A government agency authorized to install and use a pen 
register or trap and trace device under this chapter or under State law shall use 
technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or decoding of electronic 
or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information utilized in 
the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic communications so as not to include 
the contents of any wire or electronic communications.‖) (emphasis added). 
 252 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).  
 253 See In the Matter of the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. 
(SEALED) and (sealed) and the Prod. of Real Time Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 
(D. Md. 2005) (―As the phone changes location, it automatically switches to the cell site 
that provides the best reception,‖ and therefore there is no default location).  
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This release of data has a minimum value simply because it is 
restricted.  As far back as 2001, courts recognized a value in this 
user information.
254
  The following explosion of a data-based web 
economy took this proposition even farther.  Not only does data 
have value for the companies that collect it, but users have also 
recognized that they control an asset that can be used as currency 
for exchange.
255
  Mobile check-in based applications illustrate this 
fundamental change in how data is used.  Data has in some cases 
become a form of currency.
256
  Users that check-in to places are 
often given rewards for their information.  These rewards range 
from digital goods, like badges,
257
 to coupons,
258
 to physical 
products like a scoop of gelato.
259
  The fact that retailers and 
businesses are willing to exchange physical goods for information 
suggests that there is real value in this information.  This value sets 
it apart from something like a phone number or address, which in 
many cases, is freely accessible to anyone with a phone book; no 
one pays you for information in the phone book. 
Applying the Katz test in light of how users treat their location-
based information supports moving this class of data outside of the 
Pen Register Statute.  Users possess a subjective expectation of 
privacy in their location.  A user‘s location is private by default, 
and it remains so until it is shared.  This is in complete contrast to a 
phone number, which users should understand is public by 
 
 254 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(―DoubleClick creates value for its customers in large part by building detailed profiles of 
Internet users and using them to target clients‘ advertisements.‖). 
 255 See infra notes 265–67 and accompanying text. 
 256 See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03 (―When users visit any of these 
DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites, a ‗cookie‘ is placed on their hard drives.‖). 
 257 See What is Foursquare?, FOURSQAURE, https://foursquare.com/about (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2011) (―By ‗checking in‘ via a smartphone app or SMS, users share their 
location with friends while collecting points and virtual badges.‖).  For a list of badges, 
see The Full List of Foursquare Badges, 4SQUAREBADGES.COM, http://www. 
4squarebadges.com/foursquare-badge-list/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).  
 258 See Jon Fougner, Introducing Deals, FACEBOOK (Jan. 31, 2011, 9:58 AM), 
http://www.facebook.com/blog.php?post=446183422130. 
 259 This is just one example of a Foursquare promotion.  This one was instituted by 
Whole Foods and it gave away a physical product. See, e.g., Nick Saint, Whole Foods 
Pushing Its Foursquare Promotion Hard, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 7, 2010, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/wholefoods-is-pushing-its-foursquare-promotion-hard-
2010-8. 
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default.
260
  This fundamental difference affects the way in which 
users value these different types of information.  Users recognize 
that private information, which definitionally is more difficult to 
obtain, may be assigned a higher value than public information that 
is available to everyone.  That there is a market for location-based 
information is proof of this value and further demonstrates the fact 
that users believe that their information is private until they choose 
to share it.  Furthermore, this expectation of privacy is one that 
society would likely recognize as reasonable.  In this instance, 
smartphone users benefit from the Kyllo standard.
261
  Location-
based information, unless it is shared, is something that cannot be 
observed without special technology.
262
  Because this technology 
is not generally available to the public, society would recognize an 
individual‘s expectation of privacy in his location as reasonable, at 
least until it is publicly disclosed. 
C. The Consent Exceptions to the ECPA Are Too Broad 
Data collectors can always acquire consent to collect user 
information.  Within the Katz framework, once a user shares his 
location with a third party or consents to its capture, he loses any 
expectation of privacy he previously had.
263
  Users that choose to 
share their location with others recognize, or should recognize, that 
this is the case.
264
  The Internet, however, has changed the way 
data is transmitted between parties.  The current concerns 
regarding consent are not about how information is being used.  
Instead, the concerns involve the transfer of information to a third 
 
 260 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (finding that telephone subscribers 
cannot ―harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret‖). 
 261 See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text.   
 262 See, e.g., In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (―There are two distinct technological approaches for fixing the location of a 
cell phone: handset-based (GPS) and network-based (cell site).‖). 
 263 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (―What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.‖ (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); 
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927))). 
 264 For websites like Foursquare that publicly stream check-ins down their homepage, 
this assertion is more obvious than it is for closed networks like Facebook in which 
information may be disclosed to only a limited number of individuals.  However the 
effect on privacy is the same. 
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party, one to whom the user never provided direct consent and the 
existence of whom the user may not even be aware. 
DoubleClick
265
 illustrates the potential problems of transferring 
consent in this situation.  In its decision, the court analyzed the use 
of cookies, in online advertising.  It held that for DoubleClick, an 
online advertising network, to collect information from a user it 
needed only to obtain permission from the website that user 
accessed, and not from the user himself.
266
  The court‘s reasoning 
was similar to that in the disclosure cases.
267
  The court reasoned 
that the information the user disclosed to the website was 
analogous to information one discloses to another person during a 
conversation.  Just as the other party to the conversation would be 
free to tell his friends about anything that was said, a website 
should be free to disclose any information it receives from a user‘s 
visit.
268
  Because anything a user knowingly discloses to the 
public, or in this case a website, is no longer subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, there is no reason that the 
website should be prevented from disclosing that information. 
However, this is an imperfect analogy.  Users never utilized 
DoubleClick‘s services voluntarily.  Instead, DoubleClick 
collected user data as it was transmitted to the website.  
DoubleClick sat between the user and the website as a silent 
middle man.  Users who visited the websites associated with 
DoubleClick did not know that their information was being 
collected by anyone other than the site they were visiting.  They 
had never actively granted consent to DoubleClick‘s collecting 
their data. 
This factual difference was insignificant to the DoubleClick 
court.
269
  The court reasoned that because the user had granted 
permission to the website to collect its information, that website 
was then free to transfer whatever it collected to a third party. The 
court explained that if the information being supplied to the 
website could be freely transferred once the website possessed it, 
 
 265 In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  
 266 Id. at 510.  
 267 See id. at 510–11. 
 268 Id. at 511. 
 269 Id. at 514. 
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then the website should be allowed to skip a step and authorize 
DoubleClick to intercept the transfer and collect the data necessary 
to supply advertisements.
270
  Functionally the end result is the 
same—DoubleClick gets the user data it needs—but the legal 
implications are very different. 
The court‘s approval of the DoubleClick model substantially 
alters how consent functions on the Internet.  Traditionally, under 
the Fourth Amendment, only information that a user knowingly 
discloses to the public is no longer subject to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  After DoubleClick, a knowing exchange of 
information is no longer necessary; the intended recipient of a 
user‘s data can grant consent to others to collect that information.  
This nuance restricts a user‘s ability to choose the websites with 
which he wishes to share information. 
IV. SOLUTIONS 
Courts that are forced to interpret the ECPA are left with a 
difficult task.  They must balance individual privacy with the 
freedom to use emerging technologies.  Fortunately, this conflict 
can be resolved.  Correcting each of the flaws enumerated above 
will provide substantial progress by creating an ECPA that more 
accurately reflects the modern use of technology.  Some of these 
solutions are already being implemented.  H.R. 5777
271
 for 
instance shows that Congress is starting to recognize the problems 
that currently surround data collection.  However, there is more 
that can and should be done. 
A.  Redefine Stored Communication  
Congress should modify the ECPA to eliminate the distinction 
between communications that are stored or in transmission when 
 
 270 Id. 
 271 See Building Effective Strategies to Promote Responsibility Accountability Choice 
Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards Act, H.R. 5777, 111th 
Cong. (2010).  In July 2010, Representative Bobby L. Rush (D. Ill.) introduced 
legislation ―[t]o foster transparency about the commercial use of personal information, 
provide consumers with meaningful choice about the collection, use, and disclosure of 
such information, and for other purposes.‖ Id.  
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they are intercepted.  Not only is the distinction illogical but it is 
also unnecessary.  As it is now drafted, the plain language of the 
statute supports the Szymuszkiewicz court‘s reading of mutual 
inclusion.
272
  The term ―intercept‖ is defined as any ―acquisition of 
the contents of any . . . electronic . . . communication through the 
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.‖273  As the court 
in Szymuszkiewicz noted, there is no timing requirement written in 
the statute.
274
  The courts applying the narrow reading of 
―interception‖ are using an outdated definition that does not make 
sense in a modern context.
275
  Congress should remove this 
alternative interpretation so that there is a clear standard to follow. 
Clarity is most easily achieved by modifying the ECPA such 
that (1) the Wiretap Act covers all situations where a 
communication is ―intercepted‖ by an unintended party and (2) 
Title II, the SCA, specifically only applies to situations where 
individuals access computers or databases they were not supposed 
to.
276
  While this may have been Congress‘s original intent, the 
current language is unclear.  This change would take the focus off 
of the status of a communication when it was intercepted, and put 
it more appropriately on the actual harm that resulted.  Congress 
may have a legitimate reason for keeping the two classes of 
communication separate; for instance, hacking to retrieve a stored 
record is a different type of intrusion than real-time monitoring is, 
and they cause different harms.  But, a reformed ECPA need not 
sacrifice policing one for the sake of the other. 
This proposal, based on the Szymuszkiewicz court‘s suggestion 
that the two titles be allowed to overlap
277
 is beneficial because it 
 
 272 See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 273 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).  
 274 See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 705–06. 
 275 See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that courts that follow the narrow 
definition of ―intercept‖ that requires it be contemporaneous with transmission generally 
look to a particular case, United States v. Turk, which interpreted a different version of 
the statute, one that existed before the amendments were made to the ECPA to include 
electronic communications). 
 276 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(―Title II . . . aims to prevent hackers from obtaining, altering or destroying certain stored 
electronic communications.‖).  
 277 See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 705. 
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helps ensure that the ECPA is flexible enough to accommodate 
future events.  The problem with a mutually exclusive reading, 
classifying a given communication as either stored or in 
transmission, is that it ignores the possibility of a situation in 
which a violation of both titles occurs at the same time.  The 
Szymuszkiewicz court illustrates a simple example, the VoIP phone 
call.  For these, the Wiretap Act affords one level of protection 
while the SCA affords another.
278
  A VoIP call, by the nature of its 
transmission is stored at the time it is transmitted.
279
  Allowing 
instead for a reading that takes advantage of both provisions would 
bring the statute more in line with how technology currently 
functions, and produce more consistent results. 
New technologies will continue to blur the line between 
storage and interception.  The fingerprinting of digital devices, a 
rapidly growing business, is one such example.
280
  Under the 
existing statute, it is not clear whether the collection of unique, 
device-identifying data stored within a computer or mobile phone‘s 
memory qualifies as accessing a stored communication or 
interception of a transmitted piece of data intended for another 
source.  Nothing says it cannot be both.  As suggested, a standard 
that distinguishes between interception and access as classes of 
intrusion rather than the status of a communication at the time it is 
intercepted has a better chance of adequately addressing the further 
harm.  
B. Close The Doughnut Hole In The Pen Register Statute 
The Pen Register Statute should not apply to location-based 
information because the extremely low standard of access it 
provides does not reflect the legitimate expectation of privacy an 
individual has in his location.  Location-based information is 
different than the types of non-content information the Pen 
Register Statute was intended to control.
281
  The recording of 
 
 278 Id. at 706. 
 279 Id. 
 280 See Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Race is on to “Fingerprint” 
Phones, PC‟s, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2010, at A1, available at http://online.wsj. 
com/article/SB10001424052748704679204575646704100959546.html. 
 281 See Supra Part II. 
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location-based information is much more intrusive compared to 
monitoring the phone numbers an individual dials.
282
  Knowing 
which phone numbers an individual dialed might tell law 
enforcement who an individual chose to contact, but it will not 
reveal where he was, or what he was doing when he placed the 
call. 
Cell phone users recognize this distinction and treat the two 
kinds of information differently.  Even assuming that the Supreme 
Court‘s position in Smith v. Maryland283 is correct and users do not 
expect any privacy in the phone numbers they dial, the same 
assumption cannot be made for location-based information.
284
  As 
already discussed, location-based information is more likely to be 
viewed as content by the user, and therefore he will also attach an 
expectation of privacy to that information.  Thus, whether it be a 
check-in on Foursquare or a tagged photograph on Facebook, this 
content information falls outside the scope of the Pen Register 
Statute, upon a plain reading of its terms, and courts should not 
apply additional statutory authority to make it fit.
285
 
There are two possible solutions that will close this doughnut 
hole in the statute.  First, Congress could completely remove the 
―solely pursuant‖ language and thereby limit the Pen Register 
Statute to its terms.  Alternatively, Congress could specify which 
statutes it would allow to be used in conjunction with the Pen 
Register Statute, rather than letting the courts or law enforcement 
pick and choose the additional statutory authority.  Closing the 
loophole entirely by restricting the Pen Register Statute to its terms 
is the better option in terms of protecting user privacy.  It would 
bring the statute closer to its original function and allow law 
enforcement easy access to a certain, limited class of data, data in 
 
 282 See Supra Part III.B. 
 283 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (explaining that phone numbers 
are subject to less protection because ―we doubt that people in general entertain any 
actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.‖). 
 284 The uproar that occurred when users realized that Apple was storing their location 
strongly suggests that users do not believe that they have no expectation of privacy in 
their current location. See supra note 9.  
 285 See supra Part III.B. 
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which users already have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
286
  
While it is possible that fixing the stored/in transmission 
distinction would correct this problem on its own, removing the 
loophole by moving protection of location-based data from the 
SCA and to the Wiretap Act is the surest way to ensure consistent 
results. 
C. Require Actual Consent To Each Use 
This is one area in which Congress has recognized a problem 
and taken action. H.R. 5777, introduced into the House on July 19, 
2010, requires companies to disclose their purposes for collecting 
user data
287
 and to obtain user consent for the specific access they 
are seeking.
288
  This bill addresses the ―transferred consent‖ 
problem that was present in the DoubleClick case,
289
 and attempts 
to solve the problem by enforcing a standard of disclosure about 
what is being collected. 
However, such a requirement does not address the loopholes 
that exist in the current regulation.
290
  Furthermore, corporations 
have already found a way to work around the H.R. 5777 
requirements—they classify additional information collected as 
non-content data.
291
  This technique stems from the existing 
statutory language of the Pen Register Statute and follows the 
rationales of Smith
292
 and Miller.
293
  If the information collected by 
 
 286 Congress initially drafted the SCA to address only stored communications that were 
not generally available to the public. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, Section 201 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3589. 
 287 See Building Effective Strategies to Promote Responsibility, supra note 271.  
 288 See id. (―In General- Except as provided in subsections (e) and (f) and section 106, it 
shall be unlawful for a covered entity to collect or use covered information about an 
individual without the consent of that individual, as set forth in this section.‖). 
 289 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 290 Building Effective Strategies to Promote Responsibility, supra note 271 (explicitly 
not overruling the ECPA). 
 291 See Foursquare Labs, Inc., Privacy Policy, FOURSQUARE, http://foursquare.com 
/legal/privacy (last updated Jan. 12, 2011) (―Information Collected Automatically: When 
you use the Service, foursquare automatically receives and records information on our 
server logs from your browser or mobile platform, including your location, IP address, 
cookie information, and the page you requested.  We treat this data as non-Personal 
Information, except where we are required to do otherwise under applicable law.‖ 
(emphasis added)).  
 292 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).  
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location-based mobile services is non-content, or is ―non-
personal‖294 information, then an individual likely has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that data.  Once it is disclosed 
to the location-based mobile service, non-content information 
would be treated like a business record.
295
  As such, these records 
can then be freely disclosed.
296
 
H.R. 5777 does not sufficiently solve the problem of 
transferred consent.  In many ways enforcing a consent 
requirement hinges on restructuring the ECPA so that a user‘s 
location is treated as content information.  Content information can 
be regulated much more heavily than non-content information 
because individuals have a legitimate expectation that the content 
of their messages will remain private unless they choose to 
disclose it.
297
  The ECPA provides a clear example of how this 
distinction currently applies to law enforcement.  The Wiretap Act 
regulates access to content and the Pen Register Statute regulates 
access to phone numbers, and they create two noticeably different 
standards.
298
 
The distinction between content and non-content information is 
essential to regulating private businesses as well because it firmly 
establishes how information should be treated.  Content 
information is more sensitive than non-content information.  This 
difference is recognized by the ECPA, which subjects the two 
classes of information to separate standards.
299
  It is reasonable to 
ask that companies that collect content data acquire consent to do 
so, and thereby abide by the ECPA‘s structure.  Because users 
have the right to assume that their information will not be 
 
 293 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (―[R]espondent can assert 
neither ownership nor possession.  Instead, these are the business records of the banks.‖). 
 294 See id.   
 295 See id.  
 296 See id. at 443 (―The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that 
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.‖ (citing United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971))). 
 297 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 298 See supra Part II.  
 299 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848. 
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disclosed unless they choose to disclose it,
300
 users may be willing 
to consent to giving these companies content information only if 
certain conditions are met.
301
  However, if a user‘s location is 
treated as non-content information, then it falls into the same 
category as a telephone number.  With no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in this non-content information,
302
 location-based 
mobile services do not need to ask for consent or notify the 
individual about how they are using that data.  This process not 
only mischaracterizes how users view their location-based 
information, but more importantly, it also distorts how the 
location-based mobile services collect and use that information. 
D. Treat Location-Based Data More Like Property 
Location-based mobile data has many of the same 
characteristics of property.  It is fixed when it is in storage, it has a 
monetary value, and it is sold and traded on a regular basis.
303
  
Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, it is used as 
consideration in exchange for goods and services.
304
  Privacy 
regulation should recognize the market exchange that is already 
taking place between smartphone users and mobile service 
providers.  This relationship is not the same as the one between an 
Internet user and the ad network that collects information and uses 
his information to sell advertising.  There, the value of user data is 
derivative—created by the ad network supplying its service, 
banner ad placement, to other companies.  Location-based mobile 
data, on the other hand, has actual monetary value.
305
  Companies 
encourage users to share their information in exchange for tangible 
rewards.
306
  Whether this is represented by a discount or by free 
scoops of ice cream, it is clear that the data collectors are willing to 
compensate users for their information.  This indicates that 
 
 300 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 301 For example, for safety reasons a user may not want to expose his location to a 
mobile service that sells or distributes his information. 
 302 See supra Part II. 
 303 See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (2011). 
 304 See supra Part III.B. 
 305 See supra Part III.B. 
 306 See id. 
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location-based user data should be treated differently, and under a 
different standard. 
Treating data as property in a mobile setting would address the 
shortcomings of the ECPA.
307
  The stored/in transmission issue 
would disappear.  A statute that recognizes mobile data as 
something that resembles property would determine access to that 
data based on whether one has a legitimate expectation of privacy 
at the time it is collected.  This new standard would not have to 
rely on artificial determinations of a communication‘s status at the 
time of interception, but rather would focus on the collection of 
data as a type of a seizure.  This would create a standard that courts 
are familiar with applying and one that will be effective and 
relevant as long as mobile data has value. 
Furthermore, there would not be any confusion about whether 
the Pen Register Statute applies.  Conceivably, the public would 
object to property being classified as non-content information.  
Such a characterization would run counter to existing intellectual 
property norms, specifically copyright, which allow users to own 
the content of their creations.
308
  This is not to suggest that user 
data should be treated to copyright protection,
309
 but only suggests 
that a recognition that user content is property is not a concept that 
is alien to our legal system. 
Lastly, treating user data as property would make it clear that 
consent is required for third-party access.  This logic is more 
closely related to preventing a misappropriation of value than it is 
in trespass.
310
  The changes to Foursquare‘s privacy policy,311 
highlight the need for this value analysis.  If user information is 
capable of being exchanged for something, it should be exchanged 
at the user‘s discretion.  An outside third party with an interest in 
 
 307 See supra Part III. 
 308 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2006). 
 309 See Feist Publ‘ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1991) (holding 
that copyright protection applies only to the portions of data compilations that are 
original to the author and not to mere facts). 
 310 See Michael A. Carrier, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1485, 1486 
(2007) (arguing against creating a right to exclude users from making electronic contact 
to their network as one that exceeds traditional property notions). 
 311 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  
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collecting that information for free should not be allowed to decide 
that it has no value.  The value of information should be decided 
by negotiations between the two parties.  Some academics fear that 
any negotiation process would require a complex market for data 
exchange.
312
  This fear, however, is misplaced as informal 
negotiations already happen on a daily basis.
313
  When users decide 
that checking-in and sharing their information with Whole Foods is 
worth the scoop of gelato offered in exchange, they are 
determining the market value of their data.
314
  With the right 
information available, and H.R. 5777 suggests it will be in the 
future, users can make more informed choices about what their 
information is worth and can choose to share it with those 
companies that they feel adequately represent that value. 
A conception of mobile privacy that is built on property rights 
also correctly accounts for the harm created by the secondary uses 
of data.  Almost ten years ago, DoubleClick illustrated the dangers 
associated with information being sold, collected, and aggregated 
by one party.
315
  Following its billion-dollar acquisition of 
consumer records, DoubleClick was in position to compile a 
database that accounted for and tracked approximately 90 percent 
of the American public.
316
  Similar efforts today are even more 
advanced.
317
  Users can be tracked not just by their habits but also 
by the unique ―fingerprint‖ their device leaves behind wherever 
they go.  Companies need to be forced to disclose what they are 
collecting information for and where that information is going, 
beyond their own servers.  This argument is again grounded in a 
property value-based analysis of personal data.  Misrepresenting 
contract terms is prohibited, and it follows that misrepresenting the 
terms of an information exchange should also be prohibited.  
Information is a valuable asset and, as with any transaction, the 
 
 312 See Carrier, supra note 310.  
 313 See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 
1136 (2000) (arguing that an institutional market infrastructure would not be necessary to 
make new property rights in personal information work).   
 314 See supra Part III.B.    
 315 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 316 Id.  
 317 See Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 216.  
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risks associated with that transaction change its value.  Consumers 
are unable to accurately value the information they are agreeing to 
supply when they lack accurate information as to how his 
information will be used.  Perhaps a check-in at Whole Foods is 
worth more than a scoop of gelato.  Without an accurate 
representation of the risk associated with that disclosure, the 
consumer is at a much greater risk of making an unfair deal.
318
 
CONCLUSION 
Changes in how users are sharing data have created a need to 
update the existing regulations. While proposed legislation 
currently in committee addresses some of the issues, it does not go 
far enough to close the current loopholes and mischaracterizations 
that threaten mobile user privacy.  In addition to adopting a new 
set of standards regulating data collection, flaws in the ECPA need 
to be addressed.  By mirroring how users and the industry value 
information, the statute could be amended and the current gaps in 
the regulation could be closed. 
 
 
 
 318 H.R. 5777 makes significant progress in this area, particularly through a provision 
that allows the FTC to enforce fair commercial practices in data collection. See Building 
Effective Strategies To Promote Responsibility Accountability Choice Transparency 
Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. §§ 601–
03 (2010).  
